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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 02-1822

GERALD PALADINO; JAMES WRIGHT
v.
PHILADELPHIA HOUSING AUTHORITY;
FREDERICK S. PURNELL, INDIVIDUALLY
AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
GEORGE FIELDS, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN
HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; CHARMAINE MORTON,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
EDWARD A. FRANCE, JR., INDIVIDUALLY AND
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; JOHN DOE,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
JANE DOE, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY;
Philadelphia Housing Authority,
Appellant

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
D.C. Civil No. 99-cv-06424
District Judge: The Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 4, 2003

Before: ROTH, BARRY, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: March 26, 2003)
____________

OPINION
____________

BARRY, Circuit Judge
Appellees Gerald Paladino and James Wright filed this reverse-race discrimination
lawsuit against the Philadelphia Housing Authority (“PHA”), appellant herein, and four
individual defendants under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 &
1983, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 PA. CONS. STAT . ANN. § 951-962.
Appellees’ §§ 1981 and 1983 claims against the PHA were dismissed on summary
judgment, and one individual defendant, George Fields, was dismissed before the jury
deliberated. The jury found for appellees as to their claims against the PHA, and against
appellees as to their claims against the three remaining individual defendants, Frederick
Purnell, Edward France, and Charmaine Morton. The District Court denied the PHA’s
renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The
Court granted in part and denied in part appellees’ motions for attorneys’ fees and entered a
second amended judgment in the amount of $160,690 in favor of Paladino and $152,690 in
favor of Wright. The PHA appealed. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
and we will reverse.
Because the parties are familiar with the facts of the underlying dispute, we will
discuss them only as necessary to resolve the issues presented.
We exercise plenary review over an order denying a motion for judgment as a matter
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of law. Gagliardo v. Connaught Labs., Inc., 311 F.3d 565, 568 (3d Cir. 2002). We
generally review the decision whether to grant a new trial for an abuse of discretion, but we
give plenary review to pure questions of law. Foster v. Nat’l Fuel Gas Co., 316 F.3d 424,
429-30 (3d Cir. 2003).
The heart of the PHA’s appeal is its contention that the jury’s verdict is fatally
inconsistent. The jury found that the PHA unlawfully discriminated against appellees in
violation of Title VII and the PHRA, but it also found that France, Morton, and Purnell were
not liable as aiders and abettors under the PHRA and not liable under §§ 1981 and 1983.
Appellees did not appeal the latter finding and, appellees’ suggestion to the contrary, the
PHA did not waive the inconsistent verdict issue. See, e.g., A204, A209-12.
The District Court correctly instructed the jury that it could find that the defendants
violated Title VII or § 1981 only if appellees’ race “played a role and was a determinative
factor in the defendants’ decision-making and/or conduct which resulted in the denial of
[the] promotion.” The jury was also correctly instructed that individual defendant liability
for aiding and abetting required “sharing of wrongful intent” with the PHA, and that the PHA
can make decisions and act only through its agents.
A finding of intentional discrimination requires a finding that at least one person
acting as the PHA’s agent had a discriminatory animus towards appellees. Even if the jury
drew the inference that the PHA willfully withheld incriminating documents, for example,
it would have had to infer that a particular agent of PHA was responsible for the
discrimination alleged against appellees. Since the bulk of appellees’ evidence pointed to
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France or Morton, who were found to be not liable, the jury could not have found that
sufficient evidence existed that Neil Wortman, who worked with France to develop the
second selection process and ultimately made the decision to promote Fields, or any other
minor actor in this drama, discriminated against appellees. If the jury concluded, as it did,
that none of the three individual defendants had a wrongful intent, and no other PHA agent
could plausibly be at fault, then the PHA cannot be liable.
In City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796 (U.S. 1986), the Supreme Court
upheld a district court’s order dismissing all charges against a city and its police
department based on the jury’s verdict exonerating the individual police officer from
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an unlawful arrest and the use of excessive force. The
Court reasoned that the city and the police department were sued only because they were
thought legally responsible for the officer’s actions; “if the latter inflicted no constitutional
injury on respondent, it is inconceivable that petitioners could be liable.” Id. at 799. So,
too, here.
The jury was correctly instructed on the law, and its verdict finding that France,
Morton, and Purnell did not discriminate against appellees and did not aid and abet the PHA
in discriminating against appellees is entirely reasonable in light of the weakness of the
evidence against them. Moreover, its verdict regarding the individual defendants fatally
undercuts the verdict finding the PHA liable. Therefore, the District Court erred in denying
the PHA’s post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new
trial. Because the inconsistency of the jury’s verdict requires us to reverse, we do not need
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to reach the manifold other issues raised by the PHA.
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse and remand with instructions to enter
judgment as a matter of law in favor of the PHA.

TO THE CLERK OF COURT:
Kindly file the foregoing opinion.

/s/ Maryanne Trump Barry
Circuit Judge
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